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Action

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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TO: Secretary of State

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Department Circular telegram 816.

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Khrushchev acknowledgement and withdrawal missiles was most effective gap-filler in Algerian understanding Cuban affair. Up to that moment strongly pro-Cuban propaganda in local media gave impression we bringing intolerable pressure on independent revolutionary states like Algeria and seeking pretext for overthrowing regime we did not like. Algerian Government and press has refused eat crow but there has been eloquent tapering off pro-Cuba interest, which was largely temporary local phenomenon artificially stimulated. Most effective Communist gambit has been exploit Ben Bella-Castro brotherhood, pretended threat US invasion and presence Guantanamo. So long as present Cuban problem not fully disposed of there will probably continue be minor reverberations in this sense. However, Ben Bella regime has been largely disillusioned (which we have made most of by stressing orally and in writing major US arguments) and Cuba may disappear as rapidly as it became impediment US-Algerian relations.

We think best way capitalizing on outcome is to let lesson have its own effect, not pushing immediately on other issues but responding as Algerians show interest in our views. For example, at request Foreign Minister I have prepared for him strong memorandum setting forth US position on admission Red China to UN, using materials supplied by Department.

PORTER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDO/MB

REVIEWED BY: [Signature]

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